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Article: 
The concept of intrinsic value has enjoyed a long, rich history. From the time of the ancient Greeks to the 
present day, philosophers have placed it at the foundation of much of their theorizing. This is especially true of 
G.E. Moore, who made it the cornerstone of his Principia Ethica.
1
 Yet this venerable concept has recently come 
under serious, sustained attack. My aim in this paper is to show that this attack has been unsuccessful. 
 
When Principia Ethica appeared, its impact on the philosophical community was immediate and profound.
2
 Of 
course, much of what Moore had to say was, and continues to be, strongly disputed. The view that goodness is a 
simple nonnatural property has been criticized by many people and in many ways. Some have argued that 
goodness is an analyzable property.
3
 Others have argued that it is a natural property (or relation).
4
 Still others 
have argued, more radically, that goodness is not a property (or relation) at all.
5
 But none of these critics has 
rejected the very idea of goodness. None of them, that is, has contended that to say of something that it is good 
(in Moore's sense) is to speak nonsense. Yet just this is the charge of certain recent critics. Peter Geach was one 
of the first of these critics.
6
 Bernard Williams has endorsed these criticisms.
7
 Philippa Foot has also indicated 
that she rejects the notion of goodness that consequentialists such as Moore invoke.
8
 Finally, and most recently, 
Judith Thomson has in a number of places forcefully pressed the view that there is no such thing as the sort of 
goodness with which Moore is concerned.
9
 What she calls 'Moore's story' about the right and the good (in short: 
part one — there is such a property as goodness; part two —there is therefore such a relation as betterness; part 
three — the right is analyzable in terms of the relation of betterness) goes wrong, she claims, right at the start.
10
 
Whereas most critics of consequentialism have attacked part three of this story, Thomson, like Foot, attacks part 
one. 
 
It is with Thomson's claims that I shall be particularly concerned in this paper.
11
 My purpose is not to defend 
consequentialism, for I agree that there is reason to be suspicious of part three of Moore's story. But part one 
seems to me beyond reproach, and my aim here is to rebut Thomson's attack against it. Since what follows takes 
a number of twists and turns, let me now provide an outline as a guide. 
 
Section I: a discussion of Geach's observations about how 'good' operates and of Thomson's elaboration on 
them. (Thomson does not fully endorse Geach's view but she does build on it.) In this section I present two 
theses that Thomson claims to be true and that she claims threaten Moore's conception of goodness. 
 
Section II: a brief consideration of a response to Geach's and Thom-son's views based on remarks by W.D. 
Ross. 
 
Section III: two types of goodness distinguished: generic and intrinsic. It is here that Thomson's case against 
Moore begins to unravel, since it becomes clear that the concept of goodness that she attacks and which she 
attributes to Moore is that of generic goodness, which is in fact not the concept of goodness (intrinsic goodness) 
with which Moore is primarily concerned in part one of his 'story.' (In this section I also cast doubt on the 
success of Thomson's attack against the concept of generic goodness.) 
 
Section IV: a return to Geach's view, in light of the distinction between generic and intrinsic goodness. Given 
the distinction, the relevance to intrinsic goodness of his observations about how 'good' operates is rendered 
dubious. 
 
Section V: a discussion of Thomson's distinction between derivative and nonderivative goodness. Here I argue 
that Thomson is quite right to draw this distinction, which is in fact also drawn by the proponents of intrinsic 
value. Thomson claims that nonderivative goodness does not constitute a 'way' of being good in the manner that 
other types of goodness do. I argue that she is once again quite right about this, but that this doesn't threaten the 
concept of intrinsic goodness, once it is recognized that intrinsic goodness (as traditionally conceived) involves 
being nonderivatively good in a particular way. 
 
Section VI: brief discussion of a suggested taxonomy of goodness. 
 
The central point that I shall be trying to make is that Thomson's attack on the concept of intrinsic value simply 
misses its mark. I think it is important to establish this, for two main reasons. First, Thomson is just one of 
several philosophers who have engaged in this sort of attack and whose prominent status makes the attack one 
that a proponent of intrinsic value cannot afford to ignore. Second, the misinterpretation of Moore's position 
upon which the attack is predicated is facilitated by the misleading way in which Moore and others have 
sometimes expressed this position. My hope is that the discussion that follows will constitute not just a defense 
of the concept of intrinsic value but the beginnings of a clarification of that concept. 
 
So much for preliminaries. Let us now begin with Geach. 
 
I 
We can draw a grammatical distinction between two ways in which adjectives can operate. An illustration will 
help make the distinction clear. 'Red' operates as a grammatically attributive adjective in the phrase 'a red book' 
and as a grammatically predicative adjective in the phrase 'this book is red.' Geach employs this same 
terminology to make a related logical distinction. As he puts it: 
 
I shall say that in a phrase "an A B" ("A" being an adjective and "B" being a noun) "A" is a (logically) 
predicative adjective if the predication "is an A B" splits up logically into a pair of predications "is a B" 
and "is A"; otherwise I shall say that "A" is a (logically) attributive adjective.
12
 
 
Thus 'red' is itself said by Geach to be a logically predicative adjective, since 
 
(1) x is a red book  
 
'splits up logically' into  
 
(1a) x is a book 
 
and 
 
(1b) x is red. 
 
But other adjectives do not sanction such 'splitting up' and so must be said to be logically attributive. Geach 
gives these examples: 
 
(2) x is a big flea; 
 
(3) x is a small elephant; 
 
(4) x is a forged banknote; 
 
(5) x is the putative father of y. 
 
In the course of his remarks, Geach also suggests a second, related test by means of which one can distinguish 
between logically predicative and attributive adjectives.
13
 Logically predicative adjectives sanction what I shall 
call 'transposition,' whereas logically attributive adjectives do not. For example, from 
 
(6) x is a red bird 
 
and 
 
(7) a bird is an animal 
 
one may infer 
 
(8) x is a red animal. 
 
With 'big,' small,"forged,' and 'putative,' however, no such inference is warranted. 
 
In Principia Ethica, Moore likened 'good' to 'yellow,' declaring that both express simple properties, the latter a 
natural property, the former a nonnatural one.
14
 But Geach claims that the analogy is badly flawed because, 
whereas 'yellow' is, like 'red,' a logically predicative adjective, 'good' is logically attributive; for 'good' sanctions 
neither splitting up nor transposition. For example, 
 
(9) x is a good car 
 
cannot be split up into 
 
(9a) x is a car 
 
and 
 
(9b) x is good. 
 
Also, from 
 
(10) x is a good cricketer 
 
and 
 
(11) a cricketer is a person 
 
one may not infer 
 
(12) x is a good person. 
 
Geach concludes: 
 
Even when "good" or "bad" stands by itself as a predicate, and is thus grammatically predicative, some 
substantive has to be understood; there is no such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a 
good or bad so-and-so.
15
 
This seems a significant conclusion. Moore contended that we may sensibly ask of certain things (such as 
pleasure, beauty, knowledge) whether they are good and sensibly answer that indeed they are good.
16
 But Geach 
claims that nothing can be just good in this way; what is good is always good relative to a certain kind. A good 
car may be a bad investment, a good cricketer may be a bad person. 
 
Thomson has elaborated considerably on Geach's thesis. She endorses his claim that 'good' is logically 
attributive, though not his conclusion that whatever is good is good relative to a certain kind. For although 
'That's good' may mean 'That's a good K,' for some kind K, it may not. When we say, for instance, that 
something is 'good to eat (look at, listen to); or 'good for use in making cheesecake (hammering in nails, Alfred, 
Alfred's lawn mower),' or that someone is 'good at hanging wallpaper (playing chess, singing),' or 'good in 
Hamlet (the play),' or 'good as Hamlet (the Prince),' or 'good with children,' and so on, we are not necessarily 
implying that the thing or person in question is good relative to a certain kind. ('For what K,' she asks, 'could it 
at all plausibly be thought that being good for Alfred is being a good K?')
17
 Rather, all such uses of 'good plus 
adjunct' involve what she calls first-order ways of being good,
18
 and being good relative to a certain kind is 
itself reducible to being good in some first-order way. For example, 'x is a good book' may mean that x is good 
to read, or good for use in teaching logic, or good to look at, etc.; which of these it means will depend on the 
context of its utterance. 
 
Thomson also identifies what she calls second-order ways of being good.
19
 If, for example, one says that a 
certain act was good, one may but is not likely to mean that it was good in some first-order way (e.g., good to 
do, or good to look at); rather, one is likely to mean that it was just, or generous, or kind, and so on. Though 
distinct from first-order ways of being good, these second-order ways of being good, she contends, nonetheless 
'rest on' first-order ways of being good. Furthermore, she claims that there are no kinds of ways of being good 
other than being good in some first-order way or being good in some second-order way.20 
 
Now, distinguishing these (kinds of) ways of being good is not itself anti-Moorean in spirit. But it may well 
seem so when coupled with the following crucial contention: if something is good, then it is good in some such 
way. Or, as Thomson puts it (I shall call this Thomson's First Thesis): '[All] goodness is goodness in a way.'
21
 
Even though she disagrees with certain aspects of Geach's view, then, Thomson is nonetheless very much in 
sympathy with its spirit. She firmly embraces the idea that goodness is always to be relativized in some way; it 
cannot stand alone. And this leads her to say the following: 'In saying "That's good", we are not ascribing a 
property goodness — indeed there is no such thing.'22 I shall call the thesis that there is no such property as 
goodness Thomson's Second Thesis. 
 
II 
There can be no doubt as to the plausibility of Geach's distinction between logically predicative and attributive 
adjectives (initial plausibility, at least; I shall express reservations about it in Section IV below); and there can 
be no doubt as to the plausibility of Thomson's emphasis (reminiscent of Georg von Wright's
23
) on the variety 
of ways in which something can be good. But the conclusion that there is no such thing as the sort of goodness 
with which Moore is concerned is unwarranted. 
 
It is worth noting that the distinction that Geach invokes was discussed more than a quarter of a century earlier 
by W.D. Ross.
24
 Ross endorsed this distinction but was nonetheless a firm supporter of the concept of intrinsic 
value. He recognized that 'good' is frequently used in a logically attributive (or, as he sometimes put it, 
adjunctive) way, and he claimed that when so used it is relative in two respects: first, it is relative to the kind in 
question (for a good x may be a bad y or z, as we have already noted); second, it is relative to other members of 
the kind in question, in that for an x to be a good x it must (he contended) be better, perhaps considerably better, 
than most xs. (There is obviously some confusion here, for it is perfectly consistent to say, for instance, that 
most, or even all, knives are good knives.
25
 Thus the second alleged type of relativization is clearly a fiction. 
But the first type equally clearly is not.) Ross also claimed, however, that 'good' can be and sometimes is used 
in a logically predicative way, and that when so used it is not relative in either of these respects. When used as a 
logical predicative, he said, 'good' expresses either intrinsic goodness (as in 'Pleasure is good') or some related 
notion such as instrumental goodness (roughly, that type of goodness which consists in being conducive to 
something intrinsically good) or ultimate goodness (roughly, that type of goodness which consists in being 
intrinsically good while having no part that is not intrinsically good). 
 
In light of Ross's discussion of the uses of 'good,' it is initially tempting to respond to the claims of Geach and 
Thomson as follows. 'You're quite right to say that "good" sometimes operates in the ways you mention. But so 
what? It would clearly be fallacious to infer from this that "good" never operates in some other way. And in fact 
it does sometimes operate in the ways that Moore mentions. Thus your observations constitute no indictment of 
his conception of goodness.' But this response would be facile. After all, Geach (presumably)
26
 and Thomson 
(certainly)
27
 are quite aware of Ross's discussion but nonetheless reject the claim that 'good' sometimes operates 
in the ways Moore mentions. Why? 
 
III 
The reason can, I think, be traced at least in part to a misleading practice of Moore's. Despite his laudable 
efforts at precision, Moore sometimes writes rather loosely, saying simply 'good' when what he means (or 
should mean) in particular is 'intrinsically good.' (This is a very common practice.
28
 I have in fact deliberately 
engaged in it in this paper, since doing so helps make the case for the opponents of intrinsic value seem 
stronger than it really is.) At the very beginning of Principia Ethica Moore says that the question he will address 
is the question 'What is good?' (note: not the question 'What is intrinsically good?'), and he goes on to say: 
'Books are good" would be an answer to it, though an answer obviously false; for some books are very bad 
indeed.'
29
 This puzzles Thomson, and understandably so. It doesn't look as if Moore is here concerned with 
intrinsic goodness, for who has ever been tempted to claim that books in general are intrinsically good? And, 
since no way of being good is specified, it may seem that Moore is concerned with some generic form of 
goodness. But this too is 'weird' (as Thomson puts it).
30
 Who has ever been tempted — indeed, what could it 
mean to say — that books in general are 'just plain good'? 
 
There is no doubt that Thomson is in large part concerned to deny that there is any generic form of goodness — 
that there is a property, as she sometimes puts it, of 'pure, unadulterated' goodness.
31
 This, indeed, is what I have 
called her Second Thesis. Now, it may be that Moore thinks there is such a property. In fact, in Ethics he 
appears to offer a definition of intrinsic goodness in terms of generic goodness when he says: 
 
By saying that a thing is intrinsically good it [that is, the theory, Utilitarianism, that Moore is 
investigating and which he endorses at least in this respect] means that it would be a good thing that the 
thing in question should exist, even if it existed quite alone, without any further accompaniments or 
effects whatever.
32
 
 
But whether or not Moore would accept the existence of a property of generic goodness, we should note that it 
seems perfectly consistent to deny its existence while nonetheless accepting the existence of intrinsic goodness. 
Moreover, it is perfectly clear that Moore's main concern in part one of his 'story' is (no matter how he may at 
times express himself) with intrinsic goodness in particular rather than goodness in general. Thus, even if 
Thomson's skepticism concerning the existence of 'pure, unadulterated' goodness is on target, this would seem 
to leave the concept of goodness with which Moore is concerned wholly unscathed. 
 
But we should ask: is there indeed no such thing as generic goodness? Thomson appears to believe that her First 
Thesis (that all goodness is goodness in a way) implies her Second Thesis (that there is no such thing as generic 
goodness). Does it? 
 
Consider the analogy with shape. (Color would provide another analogy.) It is plausible to say that all shape is 
shape in a way, that nothing can have 'pure, unadulterated' shape. What does this mean? It seems to mean (at 
least) that shape is a determinable property; nothing can have a shape without having a particular shape. Yet a 
determinable property is, of course, a property; it is a property, indeed, which unites otherwise dissimilar things. 
(Shape is something common to both squares and circles.) Why not take generic goodness to be on a par with 
shape in this regard?
33
 
 
At one point Thomson entertains the idea that there is a property of goodness after all, namely, that long 
disjunctive property of being either good in this way or good in that way or....
34
 Let us call this the property of 
being good in some way or other. In fact, Thomson says that there doubtless is such a property but then says 
that, since it's not what anybody ever means in saying 'That's good,' its title to being called 'goodness' is 
dubious. This is odd. People don't typically say 'That's shaped,' but we can imagine this expression coming into 
vogue (among car enthusiasts, say, or body-building fans). If it did, it wouldn't be used simply to mean that the 
thing in question has some shape or other. But this hardly shows that the property of having some shape or other 
has no title to being called 'shape.' 
 
Nonetheless, I think we must accept that the property of having a shape is not just the property of having some 
shape or other. After all, if one construes the notion of property liberally enough, there is presumably a property 
corresponding to the disjunction of any properties you like. There is, for example, the property of being either a 
number or a brick. What's strange about this property is that its disjuncts have nothing in common (or nothing 
interesting: I suppose they share the property of involving an entity, the property of being used in an example by 
me, and so on). The property of having some shape or other isn't like this, though, for its disjuncts do have 
something interesting in common: they all involve shape. So shape comes first, as it were; having some shape or 
other comes after. 
 
Something similar can be said about goodness. This is presumably distinct from being good in some way or 
other, since the latter presupposes the former. But then the former does exist, after al1.
35
 Indeed, Thomson 
seems to be uneasily aware of this herself. She says: 
 
[It] is not mere happenstance that the word "good" appears in the expressions "good to look at", "good at 
hanging wallpaper" ... and so on: its meaning makes a contribution to their meanings.... Intuitively, for a 
thing X to be good in one of the first-order ways is for X to benefit someone or some thing Y ... in the 
appropriate way, or to be capable of doing s.
36
 
 
Of course, she believes that all benefit is benefit in a way; but that doesn't alter the fact that all these ways have 
something in common, namely, they are all ways of being a benefit. Yet on the very same page Thomson once 
again declares: '[There] is no such property as goodness.' These statements are difficult to reconcile with one 
another. 
 
But all this is strictly by the by. For, regardless of whether we agree with Thomson's Second Thesis concerning 
the existence of some form of generic goodness, the essential point remains this: whether or not there is such a 
property as intrinsic goodness is an independent issue. 
 
IV 
Keeping in mind this emphasis on intrinsic goodness in particular, let us return for a moment to Geach's twin 
tests. Thomson's First Thesis is that all goodness is goodness in a way. I have not disputed this. In light of this 
thesis, it is tempting to diagnose the reason for the failure of 'good' to pass Geach's tests as follows: no 
particular way of being good has been specified. Once a way of being good has been specified, passing the tests 
seems plain sailing. Consider: 
 
(13) x is an apple that is good to eat 
 
would seem to split up into 
 
(13a) x is an apple 
 
and 
(13b) x is good to eat. 
 
Also, (13) and 
 
(14) an apple is a fruit  
 
would seem jointly to imply 
 
(15) x is a fruit that is good to eat. 
 
Similarly, 
 
(16) x is a painting that is good to look at 
 
would seem to split up into 
 
(16a) x is a painting 
 
and 
 
(16b) x is good to look at.  
 
Also, (16) and 
 
(17) a painting is a work of art  
 
would seem jointly to imply 
 
(18) x is a work of art that is good to look at. 
 
Now consider the following: 
 
(19) x (e.g., conscientiousness) is an intrinsically good state of mind.  
 
Doesn't it seem correct to say that this indeed splits up into 
 
(19a) x is a state of mind 
 
and 
 
(19b) x is intrinsically good? 
 
Likewise, doesn't it seem correct to say that (19) and 
 
(20) a state of mind is a state of affairs 
 
jointly imply 
 
(21) x is an intrinsically good state of affairs? 
 
Isn't this evidence that being intrinsically good is just a way of being good, as are being good to eat and being 
good to look at, constituting at once a confirmation both of Thomson's First Thesis and of the existence of 
intrinsic value? 
 
Unfortunately, matters are not quite that simple. First, there is reason to feel uneasy about the claim that being 
intrinsically good is a way of being good, as being good to eat and being good to look at are (and hence reason 
to feel uneasy about the relations just alleged between (19), (19a), (19b), (20), and (21)). I will return to this in 
the next section. Of more immediate concern, though, is that there is reason to doubt the relevance of Geach's 
tests to the issue at hand, intriguing as they are. Thomson herself expresses such doubts. Concerning Geach's 
claim that, whereas 'good' is logically attributive, 'red' is logically predicative, she says: 
 
"Red" was not in fact well chosen for Geach's purposes, since "red" is heavily context dependent: what 
we ascribe to an apple when we say "It's red" is different from what we ascribe to the paint in a certain 
can when we say "It's red". Better choices would have been "visible" or "happy" ... or ... "sauteed" ... or 
"poisonous" ... or....37 
 
Now, it seems quite right to say that what's red as far as apples go may not be red as far as paints go. But of 
course this sort of division can be continued. After all, what's red as far as Macintosh apples go may not be red 
as far as Red Delicious apples go. And, contrary to what Thomson seems to imply, what's visible or poisonous 
to x may not be visible or poisonous to y. The fact is, very many properties are determinable (to some extent) 
rather than (fully) determinate, including all those just mentioned; and, as far as I can tell, every less-than-fully 
determinate property A is such that we can imagine possible circumstances in which we would balk at inferring 
'xis a B and xis A' from 'xis an A B' (although imagining such cases may be harder the more determinate the 
property is) and possible circumstances in which we would not balk at this (although imagining such cases may 
be harder the less determinate the property is). Whether or not we do in fact balk at such inferences would seem 
to depend, then, on contingent circumstances (e.g., that the different ways of being red happen not to be — or, 
at least, happen not to be taken to be — importantly varied) which have nothing to do with the strict logical 
propriety of such inferences. This suggests that Geach's tests are simply irrelevant, pointing up no essential 
differences between the properties expressed by 'red' and 'good' and revealing no important insights into the 
nature of these properties.
38
 (It should be noted that, while Thomson endorses Geach's claim that 'good' is 
logically attributive and elaborates on this, she doesn't dwell on these tests.) 
 
V 
Even if the relevance of Geach's tests is suspect, though, they did suggest that being intrinsically good is just 
one way of being good. Why not, then, declare the existence of intrinsic value to be perfectly compatible not 
only, as I argued in Section III, with Thomson's Second Thesis (that there is no such thing as generic goodness) 
but also with her First Thesis (that all goodness is goodness in a way)? 
 
I take it that Thomson would resist this. I think that she would say that she has in mind a particular kind of way 
of being good, and that something's being intrinsically good (were this possible) would not be a case of its being 
good in this particular kind of way. Let us now look into this. 
 
Thomson is perfectly happy to acknowledge a certain distinction on which proponents of intrinsic value rely, 
the distinction between (as she puts it) nonderivative and derivative goodness. (Proponents of intrinsic value 
often talk in terms of 'intrinsic' goodness being distinct from 'extrinsic' goodness.) This distinction, she says, 
cuts across ways of being good.
39
 Something is derivatively good in some way if it inherits its goodness from 
something else; otherwise, its goodness is nonderivative. It may be, for instance, that drinking lemonade is good 
for Alfred because it quenches his thirst and his thirst's being quenched is good for him, in which case his 
drinking lemonade is derivatively good for him. It may also be, of course, that his thirst's being quenched is 
good for him only derivatively. (Whether this is so will depend on just what nonderivative goodness-for-persons 
consists in, a difficult question that we needn't address here.) Likewise, it may be that lubrication is good for 
Alfred's lawn mower; if so, it would seem that it is so only derivatively. Of course, lubrication wouldn't be good 
for Alfred, and the application of lemonade wouldn't be good for his lawn mower; goodness-for-persons 
consists in something different from what goodness-for-artifacts consists in. This leads Thomson to an 
important observation: since the distinction between nonderivative and derivative goodness cuts across ways of 
being good, it cannot itself denote ways of being good (in the sense of 'way' at issue). As she puts it: 
 
[Derivative] goodness is not itself a way of being good. A derivatively good thing is a thing that inherits 
goodness from something, and what it inherits is not derivative goodness, but rather goodness in way W, 
for the appropriate W. What it inherits might be goodness for this or that person, or [some other way of 
being good].... Since derivative goodness is not a way of being good, neither is nonderivative 
goodness.
40
 
 
I believe it is absolutely correct both to distinguish between nonderivative and derivative goodness and to deny 
that they constitute ways of being good, in the sense of 'way' at issue. (Thus, if 'nonderivatively' were 
substituted for 'intrinsically' in (19), we should clearly deny that (19) sanctions splitting up and transposition in 
the manner discussed in the last section.) It is also correct to observe that proponents of intrinsic value rely on 
this distinction when contrasting intrinsic value with extrinsic value. But of course this would show that being 
intrinsically good is not (or, better, does not involve) a way of being good, in the sense of 'way' at issue, only if 
proponents of intrinsic value claimed that being intrinsically good just is being nonderivatively good; and it is 
clear that, although someone is of course free to use the term 'intrinsically good' to mean simply what Thomson 
means by 'nonderivatively good,' this is not how the proponents of intrinsic value typically use the term (as 
Thomson herself acknowledges).41 Rather, they take being intrinsically good to be a particular way in which 
something can be nonderivatively good; being extrinsically good involves being derivatively good in that same 
way.  (Given this, the claim that (19) sanctions splitting up and transposition does indeed seem no more 
problematic than the other cases mentioned in the last section.) 
 
The key question then is: what way of being good does being intrinsically good involve? Here we will probably 
meet with some disagreement. It is certainly true that proponents of intrinsic value have not traditionally 
concerned themselves with specifying in any great detail the way of being good that being intrinsically good 
involves. Indeed, they may seem at times positively hostile to the suggestion that there is some such way. 
(Recall Ross's insistence on the nonrelativity of 'good' when used in a logically predicative way. Consider also 
Moore's use of the term 'good absolutely' to express the idea of intrinsic goodness.)
42
 Yet it is perfectly clear 
that the proponents of intrinsic value have often been at pains to distinguish the various senses of 'good' and to 
insist that 'intrinsically good' expresses only one of these senses.
43
 And if 'intrinsically good' doesn't reduce to 
'nonderivatively good,' it would seem legitimate to attribute to the proponents of intrinsic value the view that 
being intrinsically good is (or involves) just one way of being good (in Thomson's sense of 'way'). But again, 
what way is this? 
 
The answer is: ethical goodness. When it is said that pleasure, or knowledge, or beauty, or virtue is intrinsically 
good and that, for example, activities that promote such states are extrinsically good, what is meant is that all 
these things are ethically good. Now, I hasten to add that not all of these goods are moral goods, as this term is 
usually understood. Virtue is plausibly thought of as a moral good, but pleasure, knowledge, and beauty surely 
are not. What then can it mean to say that these nonmoral goods are nonetheless ethically good? This division of 
terms is admittedly awkward, since I wish to draw no distinction between ethics and morality. But the point is 
that even those intrinsic goods such as pleasure, knowledge, and beauty (assuming they are such), which are not 
normally thought of as moral goods, nonetheless have an intimate tie to morality, in that there is a moral 
requirement to favor them (welcome them, admire them, take satisfaction in them, and so on) for their own 
sakes. That which is intrinsically good is preferable to that which is not, the '-able' here expressing moral 
worthiness. 
 
This is not an original point. Many philosophers have made it." The title of Moore's masterpiece is, after all, 
'Principia Ethica.' And, despite his insistence that 'good,' when used in a logically predicative way, is not 
relative in the ways in which it is relative when used in a logically attributive way, Ross understands this point 
perfectly well. He puts it nicely in the opening paragraph to his chapter on moral goodness in Foundations of 
Ethics: 
I have suggested that things that are good in the predicative as opposed to the adjunctive sense fall into 
two classes: (1) those that are good in the sense of being worthy objects of admiration, and (2) those that 
are good in the sense of being worthy objects of satisfaction. Both of these come, from one point of 
view, within the scope of ethics; for a thing's being good in either of these ways brings into being a 
prima facie [moral] obligation to produce that thing.... But goods of the second type are not themselves, 
as such, morally good. Nor, again, are all goods of the first type themselves as such morally good; 
excellent scientific or artistic activity is good but not morally good.
45
 
 
It is an interesting question, of course, what distinguishes those intrinsic goods that are moral goods from those 
that are not. We need not pursue this question here, however." The important point is that it seems that what is 
intrinsically good is good in a certain way — it is what I have called ethically good — and thus that accepting 
Thomson's First Thesis provides no reason to reject the concept of intrinsic value. 
 
It is interesting to note that this account of intrinsic value would appear to be perfectly in keeping with the 
observations of Philippa Foot, who expresses some doubts about the concept. Foot is a critic of conse-
quentialism, claiming that 'we go wrong in accepting the idea that there are better or worse states of affairs in 
the sense that consequentialism requires.'
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 She says this because she thinks that consequentialism requires a 
sense of 'good' that is divorced from morality, in terms of which 'morally right' may be given an account, and no 
such sense can be found (although she believes that 'good' can be given a sense 'within morality,' as she puts 
it.)
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 But this misconstrues consequentialism, I think (a misconstrual of which consequentialists may themselves 
frequently have been guilty). For although it is accurate to say that consequentialists seek to account for 
'morally right' (in the sense that concerns them: overall, rather than merely prima facie, moral rightness) in 
terms of 'good,' it is nonetheless the case (I contend) that the sense of 'good' at issue is what I have called ethical 
goodness. Foot herself would in fact seem perfectly receptive to this idea. While finding fault with both 
consequentialism and the idea that some states of affairs are good or bad 'from a moral point of view,' she 
nonetheless confesses that it 'seems preposterous to deny that there are some things that a moral person must 
want and aim at in so far as he is a moral person and that he will count it "a good thing" when these things 
happen.'
49
 But this is all that is at issue when something is intrinsically good. 
 
Whether or not Foot would in the end agree with me, however, Thomson would presumably continue to 
disagree. At one point she entertains the idea that moral goodness is a way of being good, and that that is the 
way (or one way) in which compassion is good.
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 But she drifts away from this idea, neither pursuing it nor 
decisively refuting it. She appears to doubt the possibility of anyone's giving a clear account of what moral 
goodness consists in, and then moves on. But this hardly settles the matter. Whether she has in mind (as I think 
she does) 'morally good' in the sense in which virtue is often said to be morally good but pleasure not, or the 
broader sense that I have invoked in which both virtue and pleasure may (with some plausibility, at least) be 
said to be ethically good, Thomson's inability to come up with a clear account of what such goodness consists in 
of course does not imply that there is no such account to be given. And even if there is no such account to be 
given, this hardly shows that the goodness in question doesn't exist. It may be that the reason is, rather, that the 
type of goodness in question is unanalyzable, so that to the question, 'What is it that moral goods have in 
common?' one can give only the unenlightening answer, 'They're all morally good.' (Compare the question, 
'What is it that red things have in common?') 
 
Thomson might still demur. Recall her contention that, for something to be good in one of the first-order ways, 
it must benefit someone or something, or be capable of doing so. Goodness, she is thereby claiming, is always 
relative to some category of object. But to what category of object is the alleged way of being good that I have 
called ethical goodness relative? If there is none, then there is no such way of being good after all. 
 
I suppose that some might seek to respond to this by proposing some category of object to which ethical 
goodness is relative. The obvious category here would be persons. (Of course, somehow the distinction between 
being intrinsically good and being good-for-persons would have to be preserved, so that what is intrinsically 
good is good relative to persons in a way different from that in which Alfred's well-being is good-for-Alfred.) 
Indeed, person-oriented accounts of morality are extremely common (social contract theories being a prominent 
example). If some such account of ethical goodness is correct, then clearly the existence of intrinsic value is 
consistent with its being true that all first-order ways of being good involve benefit. However, I find Thom-son's 
contention dubious, and in the absence of any argument for it (Thomson simply relies on her intuition)
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 there is 
no need to endorse any such account here. But what, then, might be said to unite the ways of being good, 
making them ways of being good, if it's not the idea of benefit? My answer would be this: the idea of 
valuableness. I grant that such an answer may not seem particularly illuminating, but Thomson's answer seems 
to me no more illuminating; and, as just noted, it may be a mistake to seek an enlightening answer to such a 
question anyway. 
 
VI 
What of the orders of ways of being good? Thomson distinguishes two. I'm not sure just what should be said 
here. The intuitive picture is this: 
 
But where in this picture we should place a particular way of being good is not clear; some serious theorizing is 
called for. My inclination is to call ethical (both intrinsic and extrinsic) goodness a first-order way of being 
good, for I don't know what could be said to mediate between it and generic goodness. I am inclined to call 
moral goodness (of the sort exemplified by virtue but not by pleasure) a second-order way of being good (for it 
is to be subsumed, I believe, under ethical goodness), and certain particular goods (such as those ways of being 
good that Thomson calls second-order: being just, generous, kind, and so on) third-order ways of being good 
(for they are to be subsumed, I believe, under moral goodness. Thomson's account of what makes these ways of 
being good non-first-order ways of being good is of course different.)
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 But I shall not attempt here to argue for 
what I am inclined to say in this regard; for, while there are obvious problems to be resolved (Might not an A-
type goodness also be subsumable under B? Might it not even be subsumable at a different level under B than 
under A? Etc.), my contention that being intrinsically good involves a way of being good can be accepted even 
in the absence of an account of what order of way of being good this is. 
 
But should this contention be accepted? I acknowledge that I haven't argued for it here. Indeed, I don't know 
how to do so. I have argued that certain critics of the concept of intrinsic value have been unsuccessful, but that 
of course is not tantamount to a positive argument in favor of the concept. I can only resort to the following 
plea: isn't it clear, on reflection, that a morally sensitive person will favor certain things, but not others, for their 
own sakes? If so, that's basically all you need to accept that some things have intrinsic value. But to give you a 
further nudge towards acceptance of this, let me end by asking you to reflect on a pithy comment by Panayot 
Butchvarov, who says, when discussing Geach's claim that 'x is good' requires completion by means of a state-
ment of the form 'x is a good F': 
 
Nevertheless, millions have thought they understood Genesis 1:31: "And God saw every thing he had 
made, and behold, it was very good."
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